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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jesse Scott Cornelison appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation and ordering execution of a reduced sentence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2005, the state charged Cornelison with burglary and petit theft after he 
stole a number of items from Larry and Mary's Restaurant. (R., pp.11-12.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Cornelison pled guilty to burglary and the state 
agreed to recommend a suspended unified five-year sentence and dismiss the 
petit theft charge. (R., P .17.) The agreement also allowed Cornelison to request 
a withheld judgment without objection from the state. (R., p.17.) The court 
subsequently entered an order withholding judgment and placing Cornelison on 
probation for three years. (R., pp.23-32.) 
Approximately eight months later, the state filed a motion to revoke 
probation, alleging Cornelison violated his probation by failing to attend 
treatment, failing to report to his probation officer, and smoking marijuana. (R., 
pp.41-45.) On March 3, 2006, Cornelison admitted violating his probation (R., 
p.49), and, on March 21, 2006, the court revoked Cornelison's withheld judgment 
and imposed a unified fiVe-year sentence with two years fixed and retained 
jurisdiction (R., pp.54-58). At the end of the retained jurisdiction review period, 
the court again placed Cornelison on probation. (R., pp.63-71.) 
Just over eight months later, the state filed a second motion to revoke 
probation based on allegations that Cornelison violated his probation by being 
1 
driving under the influence, leaving the scene of an accident, 
privileges. (R., pp.73-77.) Two an 
to revoke Cornelison's probation adding allegation that 
Cornelison violated probation by consuming alcohol and to take an 
evidentiary test requested by his probation officer. (R., p.80.) Cornelison 
admitted violating his probation by consuming alcohol and the state withdrew the 
remaining allegation regarding Cornelison's criminal charges, electing to pursue 
those solely in a separate criminal case. (R., p.86.) On June , 2007, the court 
revoked Cornelison's probation and retained jurisdiction (R., .91-95), after 
which the court placed Cornelison on probation once again (R., pp.100-107). 
Two months after Cornelison was placed on probation for a third time, the 
state filed another motion to revoke probation alleging Cornelison moved without 
permission from his probation officer and failed to provide a "daily intox." (R., 
pp.109-113.) On January 15, 2008, Cornelison admitted the alleged violations 
and the state agreed to "OR release" and to continue disposition for six months. 
,p.117.) At the July 8, 2008 disposition hearing, the parties jointly 
recommended continuing Cornelison on probation, and, on July 8, 2008, the 
court reinstated Cornelison's probation. (R., pp.119-129.) 
On November 16, 2011, the state filed its fourth motion to revoke 
probation. CR., p.131.) The report of violation alleged Cornelison violated his 
probation by being charged with failing to provide proof of insurance, failing to 
to his probation officer, testing positive for marijuana, and failing to pay the 
supervision. (R., pp.132-135.) Cornelison admitted violating his 
2 
probation after which the court revoked his probation and ordered his sentence 
executed, but reduced the sentence to four years with one year fixed. (R., 
pp.137-143.) Cornelison filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's 
January 10, 2012 Order on Motion to Revoke Probation. (R., pp.145-147.) 
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ISSUES 
issues on appeal as: 
Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Cornelison 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion 
Augment with the requested transcripts? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Cornelison's probation? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed 
reduce Mr. Cornelison's sentence sua sponte upon revoking 
probation? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Cornelison failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated 
his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record 
with eight irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Cornelison failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
either revoking probation or failing to further reduce his sentence upon doing so? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Cornelison Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record 
With Eight Irrelevant Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Cornelison filed a motion to 
augment with eight as-yet unprepared transcripts. (Motion To Augment And To 
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed June 
28, 2012 (hereinafter "Motion").) The requested transcripts include (1) the 
admit/deny hearings held on March 2, 2006, June 5, 2007, and January 15, 
2008; (2) the disposition/sentencing hearings held on March 21, 2006, June 26, 
2007, and July 8, 2008; and (3) the "rider review hearing[s]" held on August 29, 
2006, and October 30, 2007. (Motion, pp.1-2.) The state filed an objection to 
Cornelison's Motion, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied the motion as to all 
requested transcripts. (Order, dated July 9, 2012.) Cornelison now contends 
that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with the requested 
transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection and has denied him effective assistance of counsel 
on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-17.) Cornelison has failed to establish a 
violation of his constitutional rights because he has failed to show that the 
requested transcripts are even relevant to, much less necessary for resolution of, 
the only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. 
5 
Standard Of Review 
to constitutional issues is one 
deference unless they are clearly erroneous, but 
review requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. 39 Idaho 375, 380, 79 3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 1 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Should This Case Be Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals, 
Cornelison Has Failed To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider 
The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Denying His Motion To Augment; 
Alternatively, Cornelison's Constitutional Arguments Fail 
In State v. Morgan, 2012 WL 2782599 (Idaho App. July 10, 2012), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
the appellant his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the 
record on appeal with various transcripts. In doing so the Court "disclaim[ed] any 
authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision 
made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of 
Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the 
state or federal constitutions or other law." Morgan at * 2. Such an undertaking, 
the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining 
an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the 
purview of this Court." kL The Court, however, "deem[ed] it within [its] authority. 
. . to evaluate and on [a] renewed motion" if, for example, "the completed 
appellant's brief and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or expanded 
issues on appeal a as to dernonstrate the need additional records 
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or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support a renewed motion." 
kL To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Cornelison's 
arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho 
Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the record with eight 
transcripts that are unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. Even if this 
Court considers the merits of Cornelison's claim, all of his arguments fail. 
As in Morgan, Cornelison argues that he is entitled to the additional 
transcripts because, he claims, the failure to provide them is a violation of his 
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and the effective assistance 
of appellate counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-17.) As an initial matter, the state 
agrees with the Court's skepticism, expressed in Morgan, that these arguments 
constitute "new information or justification for [Cornelison's] motion to augment 
the record." Morgan at 2. Nevertheless, even "assuming arguendo that the 
arguments ... may be properly entertained by this Court as a renewed motion to 
augment the record," the arguments lack merit. kL As noted in Morgan, "A 
defendant in a criminal case only has a due process right to a record on appeal 
that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below." kL at *2 (citing cases, internal quotations omitted.) 
Cornelison's appeal is timely only from the district court's January 10, 2012 
revocation order. The transcripts of the proceedings related to that revocation 
decision are included in the record on appeal and are more than adequate to 
evaluate the district court's decision. (See generally 11/22/2011 Tr. (admit/deny 
hearing), 12/13/2011 Tr. (evidentiary/plea), 1/10/2012 Tr. (disposition).) 
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the information cited 
contained in the 
Cornelison's history on probation) 
and minutes reflecting 
court in reaching its decision is 
12 L.1 - p.28, L.1 
violation 
recommendations).) The 
also contains all of the presentence prepared in Cornelison's case. 
) Cornelison's claim that transcripts of hearings that occurred 
nC>1,,,,,;;;,,,:.n 2006 and 2008 are necessary to address the district court's revocation 
in 2012 fail. See Morgan at Contrary to Cornelison's claim, State 
v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), does not hold otherwise. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.) 
In Hanington, the Court stated that, in reviewing a sentence that is ordered 
into execution following a period of probation, the Court "will examine the entire 
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment" and review 
is based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as 
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of 
probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. According to Cornelison, 
this language from Hanington requires augmentation with transcripts of all 
hearings from sentencing to the final revocation. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) The 
Court in Morgan, however, held that this interpretation of Hanington is too broad. 
Morgan at *3. The Court clarified that although it "will not arbitrarily confine 
[itself] to only those facts which arise sentencing to the time of the 
revocation of probation ... that does mean that all proceedings in the trial 
court up to and including sentencing are germane." Id. (emphasis original). 
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Rather, "[tJhe focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's 
decision to revoke probation." kl Accordingly, the Court "will consider the 
elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of 
probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal.,,1 kl 
Cornelison was afforded all the process he was due in relation to the 
preparation of the appellate record before the record was settled. As noted in 
Morgan, "The parties to an appeal have twenty-eight days from the service of the 
record to request additions or corrections to the record. Idaho appellate Rule 
1 Cornelison also relies on State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20,843 P.2d 170 (Ct. App. 
1992), as U[fJurther support" for his position. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) 
Cornelison's reliance on Warren is misplaced. Warren was placed on probation 
following an aggravated battery conviction. Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at 
171. Two years later, Warren was charged with a new crime and his probation 
was revoked in his aggravated battery case, but his sentence was reduced. kl 
Despite the reduction, Warren filed a Rule 35 motion, which was denied. kl On 
appeal, Warren challenged the denial of his Rule 35 motion in the aggravated 
battery case. In addressing this claim, the Court of Appeals noted the absence 
of either a presentence report or a transcript from the sentencing hearing in the 
aggravated battery case and concluded that "[w]ithout a more complete record 
and no argument by Warren as to why the sentence was unreasonable," there 
was no support for Warren's claim that the district court abused its discretion in 
relation to the sentence reduction or the denial of Rule 35 relief. kl Cornelison 
argues that Warren supports his position that he is entitled to the requested 
transcripts because the Court will "not address the merits of his sentence 
reduction claim" without them. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) This argument reflects 
either a misrepresentation or a misunderstanding of Warren as the Court in 
Warren clearly addressed the sentencing claim before it, but affirmed due to the 
lack of a "more complete record" or "argument by Warren as to why the sentence 
was unreasonable." Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at 171. Cornelison also 
claims "the Warren opinion indicates that [the lack of transcripts] would be 
presumed to support the district court's decision to execute the original 
sentence." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) However, nowhere in Warren did the Court 
state that missing portions of the record were presumed to support the district 
court's opinion. Moreover, the Court in Morgan expressly rejected the idea that 
missing portions of the record would be presumed to support a district court's 
revocation decision when those transcripts were not before it at the time of the 
disposition hearing. Morgan at *3. 
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29(a)." Morgan *3. "[Cornelison] was to 
not only the , but 
inclusion in the on appeal. 
[Cornelison] was the process by designate 
documents in the record necessary for appeal .... " Id. 
rules also a party may move the Supreme Court to add to the 
settled clerk's record, therein creates a right to such augmentation." 
For these reasons, the rt of Appeals has rejected the proposition, advanced 
by Cornelison, that ability to designate records necessary for 
review under I.A.R. 28 [is] insufficient to afford due process." kL 
The Court in Morgan also rejected the argument that equal protection 
mandates augmentation of all transcripts the appellant desires, stating: 
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. 
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the 
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for 
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the 
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions 
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.A.R. 29(a). Morgan's 
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his 
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to 
augment the record, precluded him from including the first 
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's 
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, 
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested. 
Morgan at *4. Cornelison's equal proiection claim fails for the same reasons. 
Finally, the Court in Morgan atso rejected the assertion that the denial of a 
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the 
assistance of counsel. Morgan at *4. Cornelison, like Morgan, failed to 
demonstrate how effective assistance of counsel is not the 
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requested transcripts." kL. Cornelison's "speculation that the requested 
transcripts 'might' bear upon the district court's revocation of probation is not 
sufficient to establish he cannot effectively be counseled." kL. Thus, Cornelison 
"has not shown that the requested transcripts are necessary for counsel to 
provide effective assistance regarding the issue raised in this appeaL" 
While Cornelison acknowledges that Morgan "does directly deal with the 
issues raised in this appeal," he argues, "at this point this case is not final." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) Although Morgan is not final, it is nevertheless 
persuasive authority that Cornelison's claims lack merit. 
In addition to noting that Morgan is not final, Cornelison also argues his 
case is distinguishable because he "is challenging not only the order revoking 
probation, but also the length of his sentence, which entails an analysis of the 
district court's sentencing rationale." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) This distinction, 
even if meaningful, which the state does not concede,2 has no relevance to the 
transcripts Cornelison claims should have been augmented to the record. The 
transcript of Cornelison's original sentencing hearing is already included in the 
record. (6/28/2005 Tr.) Moreover, as discussed in Section II, infra, Cornelison's 
sentencing argument is that the court should have further reduced his sentence 
upon revocation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20.) It is unclear why the transcript 
reflecting the court's decision to reduce Cornelison's sentence is not adequate to 
review whether the court should have further reduced the sentence. 
2 For example, while a district court is encouraged to articulate its "sentencing 
rationale," it is not required to do so, and the appellate court may review the 
sentence regardless. State v. Osborn, 104 Idaho 809,810,663 P.2d 1111,1112 
(1983). 
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All of Cornelison's claims 
record fail. 
Introduction 
the of his 
After Cornelison's fourth unsuccessful stint on probation, the 
revoked probation and ordered Cornelison's sentence executed, but reduced the 
sentence from five years, with two years , to four years, with one year fixed. 
On appeal, Cornelison "concedes that he violated the terms of his probation" but 
asserts that "[e]ven though [he] was struggling with probation, there was a 
consensus between the parties that revocation of probation was not warranted." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Cornelison also argues that the district court abused its 
discretion by not "further" reducing his sentence upon revocation in light of the 
"various mitigating factors present in this matter." (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20.) 
Both of these arguments fail to establish an abuse of discretion. 
Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
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C. Cornelison Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Revoking His Probation 
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on 
appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty, 
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994). An abuse of 
discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with 
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason. ~ 
"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 
506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of 
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether 
the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued 
probation is consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 
529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001). Any cause satisfactory to the court, 
which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify 
revocation. Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510,903 P.2d at 99. Contrary to Cornelison's 
assertions on appeal, a review of the record shows the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in revoking Cornelison's probation. 
The record reflects, and Cornelison concedes, that he repeatedly 
struggled with the requirements of probation and was given several opportunities 
to demonstrate that he could successfully complete a probationary period, but he 
never did. (See generally R.) As noted by the district court, probation "ha[d] not 
met its intended goal, which is that of rehabilitation." (1/10/2012 Tr., p.28, Ls.6-7; 
see also p.28, LS.17 -19.) This conclusion, and the related revocation decision, 
does not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Wilson, supra. 
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Cornelison argues otherwise, claiming "there was a consensus 
that revocation of probation was not in " and 
instead impose "1 days of county jail the option 
release. (Appellant's Brief, 18.) Although the second of Cornelison's 
argument accurately reflects the recommendation of the parties, the first part of 
argument is not only incorrect, it would be inconsistent with the parties' 
recommendation. At the disposition hearing, the prosecutor asked the court to 
"consider commuting [Cornelison's] sentence to a period of a local incarceration," 
specifically "180 days county jail" with no objection to work release. (1/10/2012 
Tr., p.24, LsA-9.) Cornelison also asked the court to commute his sentence to 
"county jail time," but stated his preference for a "shorter period of time" with work 
release. (1/10/2012 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-4.) Cornelison's claim that there was a 
"consensus between the parties that revocation of probation was not warranted" 
is not only factually inaccurate, it is legally inconsistent with the actual 
recommendation. The court would obviously have to revoke Cornelison's 
probation in order to execute a commuted sentence of local jail time. 
In any event, the district court rejected the parties' recommendation 
because it would not serve the purpose of what the court was trying to 
accomplish in the first place, i.e., rehabilitation. (1/10/2012 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-7.) 
The court wanted to be sure Cornelison received "additional programming," 
which would "not be available" to Cornelison if he were in jail. (1/10/2012 Tr., 
p.28, Ls.8-11.) The court also specifically considered another "mitigating factor" 
upon by Cornelison on appeal; namely, Cornelison's "family needs." 
14 
(Appellant's Brief, p.1S.) The court stated: "While I understand that the 
defendant has obligations to his family, certainly, those obligations were not so 
important to the defendant as to compel him to comply with the terms of th[e] 
court's allowance of defendant to be released into the community." (1/10/2012 
Tr., p.2S, Ls.11-16.) 
That the court did not agree to the parties' commutation recommendation 
or place Cornelison's "family needs" above Cornelison's need for "additional 
programming" does not establish an abuse of discretion. Cornelison has failed to 
show otherwise. 
D. Cornelison Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Not Further Reducing His Sentence Upon Revocation 
Cornelison asserts the district court abused its discretion when it failed to 
further reduce his sentence upon revoking probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-
20.) The record supports the district court's sentencing determination. 
Upon revoking Cornelison's probation, the district court had the authority, 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, to sua sponte reduce the underlying 
sentence imposed upon his conviction for grand theft. I.C.R. 35; State v. 
McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 400, 179 P.3d 360, 363 (Ct. App. 200S). The court 
exercised this authority and reduced Cornelison's sentence. Apparently 
unsatisfied with the extent of the reduction, Cornelison argues the district court 
abused its discretion by failing to "further" reduce his sentence given that "the 
instant offense is [his] first felony," he has ADHD and family support, and he 
claims to be remorseful. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Cornelison also notes he had 
15 
a 
been 
consent, 
performance[s]" in 2006 and 2007. (Appellant's 
driving 
compelled 
charge Cornelison pled guilty in 2005 may 
his criminal history as of that date 
the influence, driving a vehicle without the 
purchase/consumption/possession of alcohol by a minor. 
p.3.) Cornelison also continued to incur criminal charges while he was on 
probation in this case. (See R., pp.73-77, 132-135.) None of the other 
factors cited by Cornelison explain his criminal behavior, nor did they prevent him 
from continuing to commit crimes. Cornelison's "positive rider performance[s]" in 
2006 and 2007 also do not explain why his sentence should have been reduced 
in 2012, much less "further" reduced. State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430,438, 258 
P.3d 950,958 (Ct. App. 2011) (State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137,30 P.3d 
290, 292 (2001)) (an offender's "[glood performance while on retained 
jurisdiction, though commendable, does not alone establish an abuse of 
discretion in district judge's decision not to grant probation"). If anything, the 
fact that Cornelison demonstrated the ability to comply with rules only while 
confined weighs in favor of the original sentence imposed; a reduction was just 
another leniency, among many, given to Cornelison by the district court. 
This far short of an abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders revoking Day's probation and executing his sentence. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 2012. 
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JES~ICA M. LORELLO 
Deputw'Attorney General 
day of September, 2012, served 
RESPONDENT a 
BUC 
to be placed in The State Defender's located the 
Court Clerk's 
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